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Abstract 
Probability measures by themselves are known to 
be inappropriate for modeling the dynamics of 
plain belief and their excessively s�ong measura­
bility constraints make them unsmtable for some 
representational tasks, e.g. in the context of frrst­
order knowledge. In this paper, we are therefore 
going to look for possible alternatives and ex­
tensions. We begin by delimiting the general area 
of interest, proposing a minimal list of as�ump­
tions to be satisfied by any reasonable quasi-pro­
babilistic valuation concept. Within this frame­
work, we investigate two particularly interesting 
kinds of quasi-measures which are not or much 
less affected by the traditional problems. 
• Ranking measures, which generalize Spohn-
type and possibility measure�. . 
• Cumulative measures, wh1ch combme the pro­
babilistic and the ranking philosophy, allowing 
thereby a fine-grained account of static and dy­
namic belief. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The successful acting of cognitive agents in complex, 
opaque and dynamic worlds depends on their ability �o 
manipulate huge amounts of incomplete and unc_ertam 
in fonnation in a reasonable way. The representatJon of 
soft and partial know ledge together with the fonnaliza­
tion of the corresponding reasoning patterns are therefore 
major issues in artificial intelligence. Very roughly, �e 
can distinguish the following approaches to the modelmg 
of belief, i.e. of uncertain or revisable knowledge : 
• Strictly qualitative. 
Belief states are represented by specific prioritized sets 
of sentences (syntactic) [Weydert 92, Nebel92], or by 
some preference relation on possible worlds structures 
inducing an epistemic-entrenchment-like ordering on 
propositions (semantic) [Gardenfors, Makinson 88, 91]. 
• Strictly quantitative. 
Belief states are characterized by classical probabilistic 
measures [Pearl 88] or by altemative numerical ac­
counts, e.g. belief functions [Shafer 76]. 
• Semi-quantitative or semi-qualitative. 
. . Belief states are described by rough quahtatlVe mea­
sures assigning orders of magnitude [e.g. Spohn 88]. 
For most proposals, there are more or less
_ 
s�itable 
application contexts, but altogether the� �s? exhtbtt so�e 
more or less serious shortcomings. Prionuzed sententtal 
belief models are interesting because of their simplicity 
and the absence of omniscience assumptions, but the 
lacking semantic foundations and the resulting ad hoc 
character relativize their usefulness. More generally, 
strictly qualitative syntax- or semantic-based comparative 
frameworks are not fine-grained enough to handle the 
complexities of real-world knowledg�. For instanc�, we 
cannot easily model belief strength differences or mde­
pendency constraints and our decision-theoretic conside­
rations have to stay rather rudimentary. 
Among the numerical approaches, probability theory 
is certainly the best investigated and most successful 
formalism for modeling uncertain propositional know­
ledge. Even if its naive use mi�ht sometimes cause 
problems, it still appears to be the Ideal reference fonna­
Iism for more sophisticated or special-purpose representa­
tions, not to mention the practical importance of the 
powerful tools it provides. But there �e sev�ral ge�eral 
problems which have to be addressed, m particular 1f we 
want to handle changing or first-order belief states. 
• Agents cannot always associate exact numbers - e.g: _ 
probabilities reflecting betting intentions and/or statis�­
cal knowledge - with propositions. Very often, numen­
cal values are undefmed, unknown, irrelevant, cumber­
some or untractable, and more transparent, simpler 
models of reality are required, lowering the computa­
tional costs. 
• Standard conditionalization procedures in the traditional 
probabilistic context don't allow us to revise plain b�lief 
if we choose to implement it, quite naturally, by assig­
ning (subjective) probability 1. 
• The representation of complex fonns of (e.g. firSt-order) 
knowledge dealing with infinite structures is frequently 
blocked by unsatisfiable measurability constraints. 
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• There are intuitive flaws, for insL.mce the gap between 
impossibility and probability 0 or the nonexistence of 
uniform distributions on countably infinite sets. 
To a certain extent, all these problems can be solved in 
semi-qualitative quasi-probabilistic formal accounts based 
on abstract ranking measures. Their characteristic feature 
is that the value associated with the union of two sets is 
assumed to be, w.r.t. a given ranking order, just the maxi­
mum of the values attributed to the individual sets. This 
means less commitments by lower precision. Homo­
geneous countably infinite sets and proper impossibility 
are no longer barred and every ranking measure can be lif­
ted to the full power set. Related concepts have been used 
fairly successfully for multiple revisions of plain belief 
[Spohn 88], default reasoning [Weydert 91, Dubois, Prade 
91, Goldszmidt, Pearl 92] and belief modeling [Weydert 
94]. Their main disadvanL.'lge is that they can only provide 
a very rough picture, suitable for interpreting defaults but 
not for a (really) fine-grained decision-theoretic analysis. 
So, in some sense, quantitative and qualit.1.tive formalisms 
seem to offer complementary features which we might try 
to combine in a new type of mixed framework, possibly 
powerful enough for more realistic dymunic models of 
graded first-order belief. 
In this paper, we are going to develop such an inte­
grated approach by considering natural generalizations of 
probability measures. We shall proceed in four steps. To 
begin with, we shall delimit the area of interest and single 
out the minimal conditions for reasonable quasi-proba­
bilistic valuation formalisms. Next, we shall introduce and 
discuss two particularly interesting subclasses of non­
classical quasi-measures. On one hand, we have the ran­
king measures, a coarse-grained semi-qualitative notion. 
On the other hand, we have the cumulative measures, a 
fine-grained extended quantitative-qualitative measure 
concept, which tries to accumulate the best of both 
worlds. To conclude, we shall sketch how cumulative 
measures may be used to model st.'ltic and dynamic belief. 
2 QUASI-MEASURES 
Traditional probabilistic measure spaces can be seen as 
triples of the form (� 1 P 1 V), where :8 = (B, u, n, -, 0, 
1) is a a-algebra of events, i.e. a boolean algebra closed 
under countable joins (unions) and meets (intersections) 
with top 1 and bottom 0, V = (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <) is the 
positive half of the ordered real number field, and the 
probability measure P is a function from B to I R+ s.t. 
P(1) = 1 and P(uAi) = I.  P(Ai) for every countable set of 
n-disjoint Ai (a-additivity). For each such space, there is 
a corresponding conditional probability measure P( I ) : B 
x 8° -> fR+, which verifies :P(A r1 B)= 'P(A I B) x P(B) 
for B E 8° = {BE B I P(B) "# 0}. In the context of P, 
At ... An are called (conditionally) independent given B 
E 8° iffP(riAij I B)= :P(Ail I B) x . .. x 'P(Ais I B) for 
each subsequence An ... Ais of At ... An. 
Our first task now will be to see how far we can relax 
all these requirements without giving up practical rele-
vance for belief valuation or basic features of the proba­
bility calculus. In particular, we want to keep reasonable 
notions of conditioning and independency. On the other 
hand, our framework should be general enough to cover 
semi-qualitative Spohn-type formalisms like those in­
troduced for modeling defaults and revision. In the follo­
wing, we are going to propose a minimal list of assump­
tions to be satisfied by any structure claiming to support a 
reasonable form of generalized probabilistic reasoningl. 
Before, let's recall some useful algebraic notions. 
(G, *) is called a semi-group iff G ::F 0 and * is an 
associative operation on G. In (G, *),we call e neutral or 
the identity iff for all x E G, e * x = x * e = x and n 
absorptive iff for all x E G, x * n = n * x = n. A semi­
group (G, *) is a group iff it has an identity e and for all 
xEG, there is y E G s.t. x * y = y * x =e. (G, *·<) is 
called an ordered group iff (G, *) is a group, < is a linear 
ordering on G and for all x, x', y E G, x < x' implies x * y 
< x' * y). 
Definition 2.1 (�1 R1 V) is a quasi-measure space with 
event algebra :8 = (8, u, n, -, 0, 1), valuation algebra V 
= (V, #, " , n, e, «) (generalizing (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <)) and 
quasi-measureR. : B -> V iff the postulates 1.0 - 1.9 hold 
1.0 B oolean structure : 
:8 = (B, u, n, -, 0, 1) is a boolean algebra. 
The usual propositional connectives are fundamental rea­
soning tools. Infinitary closures are quite exotic. 
1.1 Valuation function: 
R. : B -> V is a function with R(O) = n, R(1) = e and 
R.(A u B)= R.(A) # R.(B) for n-disjoint A, B. 
By measure intuitions. If An B = 0, R. (A u B) should 
only depend on R.(A) and R.(B). To grasp infinitesimal 
probabilies, we have to give up (full) a-additivity because 
of missing upper bounds in nonstandard analysis. 
1.2 Additive structure : 
(V, #) is a commutative semi-group with identity n. 
Induced by the boolean properties of u and 0 together 
with the 1.1 characterization of R.. Strictly speaking, this 
requirement only concerns the possible values of R., but 
we are going to extrapolate these algebraic properties to 
the whole structure. 
1.3 Multiplicative structure : (V, c ) is a commutative 
semi-group with identity e and absorptive n. 
Based on the boolean properties of n, 0, 1 and the desire 
to set :R(A n B) = :R(A) c :R(B) for intuitively inde-
1 A different and slightly more opaque generalization of proba­
bility theory has also been developed by [Darwiche, Ginsberg 
92]. Their account is weaker insofar as it allows partially 
ordered valuation structures. 
pendent events A, B (• is meant to play the role of x), in 
particular for A, B E { 0, 1 } . 
1.4 Distributivity : 
"tv, v', w (w o (v # v') = (w o v) # (w o v')). 
Backed by the distributivity of n over u and our conside­
rations above. 
1.5 Linearity : 
(V, «) is a linear ordering. 
For decision-theoretic reasons and formal convenience. If 
necessary, we can model partiality by sets of valuations. 
1.6 Additive monotony : 
"tv, v', w (v � v' ""'* v # w � v' # w). 
Suggested by the monotonic character of measures. To ac­
count for ranking measures, we need the weak version �-
1.7 Multiplicative monotony : 
"tv, v', w (v « v' & w "# n ""'* v • w « v' • w). 
Conditioning on an independent, non-empty event should 
not affect «-relationships. 
1.8 Additive accessibility : 
'V v,v'(v!fv' ""'* 3w v#w=v') 
It should be possible to attribute an arbitrary lower value 
to a proper subvent (valuation freedom). Then, the prin­
ciple follows from 1.1. 
1.9 Multiplicative accessibility : 
"f v, v' (v !£ v' ""'* 3 w v' • w = v) 
This condition is necessary if we accept valuation free­
dom and want a suitable conditional version of R. 
To get a better understanding of these structures, we now 
consider some interesting easy consequences, e.g. the fact 
that !f or « can be defined from • . 
Theorem 2.1 Assuming 1.0 - 1.9, we have, 
1. "tv n � v, 
2. 'Vv,v'(v�v'&v'#n ""'* 3=l w v'• w=v), 
3. V'v, v' (v • v' = n & v' "# n ""'* v = n), 
4. V'v, v' (v !£ v' � 3 w � e v' • w = v), 
5. V'v, v' (n « v, v' � e ""'* n « v • v' �e), 
6. '<I A E B n � R(A) �e. 
Proof: 
1. By multiplicative accessibility, v « n would impy 
that there is a w s.t. v = o a w = n, which is impossible. 
Using linearity, this gives usn� v. 
2. Because of multiplicative accessibility, we only have 
to show uniqueness. Suppose, we had v � v', v' "#nand 
w "# w' s.t. v' • w = v' • w' = v. W.l.o.g., we may as-
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sume w « w'. But this would contradict multiplicative 
monotony. 
3. Given n !f v' and v' a n = n, 2.1.2 allows us to infer 
from v' • v = n and v' "# n that v = n. 
4. If there is a w s.t. v' " w = v and w � e, either v = n � 
v', and we are done, or n « v, v', w (by 2.1.1, 2.1.3). 
Now, suppose that v' « v and consequently w «e. Then 
multiplicative monotony would give us v' • w « v • w 
« v • e = v, which contradicts our assumption. So we· 
must have v � v'. On the other hand, if v � v', then mul­
tiplicative accessibility guarantees the existence of a w 
s.t. v' • w = v. If e « w, multiplicative monotony gives 
us either v' = v' " e « v' • w = v, which is impossible, or 
v !f v' = n. But then, v' • w = n = v for w = n �e. 
5. Multiplicative monotony and n « v, v' � e imply that 
n=n•�«v·��ea�=��� 
6. By 2.1.1 and additive monotony, n �R(A) = n # 
R(A) !fR(-A) # R(A) = R(-A u A) = R(1) = e. 
Now we are able to give an explicit definition of condi­
tioning for quasi-measures. 
Definition 2.2 For every quasi-measure space(�, R1 
V), the associated conditional quasi-measure R( I): B x 
8 -> V is defined as follows. If R(B) * n, then R(A I B) 
is the unique w E [n, e]« s.t. R(A n B) = R(B) a w (by 
2.1.2). IfR(B) = o then R(A I B)= n. 
We can justify this denotation by the following result. 
Theorem 2.2 If<�, R1 V) is a quasi-measure space, B 
E B,  R(B) "#nand RB(X) = R(X I B) for all X E B, then 
CB � RB � V) is also a quasi-measure space. 
Proof: We only have to verify 1.1. Obviously R(O I B)= 
n, R(1 I B) = e. What we still must prove is that R(A u 
A' I B) "" R(A I B) # R(A' I B) for n-disjoint A, A'. Ob­
viously, this holds for R(B) = n. For R(B) "# n, by 2.1.2, 
it is enough to show that R((A u A') n B)= (R(A I B)# 
R(A' I B)) a R(B). But (R(A I B)# R(A' I B)) a R(B) = 
(R(A I B) • R(B)) # (R(A' I B) • R(B)) = R(A n B)# 
'R(A' n B) = R((A n B) u (A' n B))= R((A u A' ) n 
B) by distributivity. 
Assuming n "# e, the relevant ordered multiplicative sub­
structure of a giv'en valuation algebra V is characterized 
by the restriction of (V, ",«) to the interval ]n, e]«. Set 
I(V) = (]o, e]«, •, »),»being the converse of«. 
Theorem 2.3 I(V) is the positive half of an ordered 
commutative group. 
Proof : Based on our definitions and 2.1.5, it is pos­
sible to show that I(V) is an ordered commutative 
semi-group with identity and minimum e. Now, exploi-
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ting 2.1.2 (for inverse uniqueness), we cllil use a well­
known technique - integer construction from the na­
tural numbers - to built llil ordered commutative group 
(G, • ', «') whose positive half is isomorphic to I(V). 
One way to distinguish valuation algebras is to consider 
the interaction patterns they induce between # and «. So, 
for every valuation context, we would like to know how 
much we have to add to an abstract quantity to get a 
bigger one. This amounts to investigate for every valua-
tion algebra V = (V, #, �, n, e, «) the corresponding 
additive magnitude ordering ««, defined by v «« w iff w 
# v = w. It is easy to see that «« "' � (by additive 
monotony) is both transitive (associativity of#) and anti­
symmetric (commutativity of #), but not n·ecessarily 
reflexive, e.g. if V = (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <).Notice however 
that n «« n. Furthermore, it follows from additive mono­
tony and accessibility that<«< is .li-extendible, i.e. if v .5i x 
«« x' S! v', then we get v «« v' (by additive accessibility, v' 
= x' # w and therefore v' S! v # v' = v # x' # w' .5i x # x' # w' 
= x' # w' = v', i.e. v' # v = v'). 
In general, «« is much coarser than .li· Setting S(w) = 
{ v I v «« w}, by extendibility an initial .5i-segment, there 
are basically three possibilities for each w : (1) S(w) = 
{ n}, (2) {n} c: S(w) c: [n, w]«, (3) [n, w]«"' S(w). In fact, 
we are going to show that it is enough to consider w ::::: e. 
In the following, let S P, S H and SR be the principles 
obtained by stating (1}, (2) resp. (3) for w =e. 
Tbeorem 2.4 If n "# e, for i = 1, 2, 3, (i) holds for e iff 
(i) holds for all x ::F. n. 
Proof: The right-to-left direction is obvious. 
(1) Suppose S(e) = {n} and n "# x = x # y for some y "# 
n. W.I.o.g. we may assume y � x, otherwise, additive 
monotony would give us x S! x # x S! x # y = x and we 
could replace y by x. By multiplicative accessibility, 
there is v ::F. n s.t. y = x • v. Because e « e # v lli!d x * n, 
we have x = x • e « x • (e # v) = x # (x. • v) = x # y, 
which is impossible. Hence, (1) must hold for all x ::F. n. 
(2) Suppose x i= n and e = e # v « e # e for some v with 
n « v «e. Then x = x • e = x • (e # v) « x • (e # e)= x # 
x and n = x � n « x • v « x • e = x. In other words, there 
is y = x • v s.t. n « y « x and x = x • (e # v) = x • e # x 
• v = x # y « x # x. Consequently, (2) is verified for all 
X "#D. 
(3) From e = e # e, we get x = x • (e # e)= x # x. That 
is, (3) is valid for alllL 
It seems natural to assume that «« should define a linear 
hierarchy of additive magnitudes. This amounts to require 
that «« should be a (transitive) modular ordering, i.e. for 
each w, v «« v' should imply w <«< v' or v «« w. 
Definition 2.3 A valuation algebra V = (V, #, •, n, e, «) is 
called hierarchical iff «« is modular. 
Standard (probabilistic) and non-standard real valuation 
algebras - based on the ordered real number field (lR+, +, 
x, 0, 1, <) resp. one of its elementary extensions including 
infinitesimals - will verify SP. Here,# is a very sensitive 
connective and adding non-zero quantities always makes 
a difference. In this context, «« is just {n }xV\{n} and 
therefore modular. That is, these valuation algebras are 
trivially hierarchical. The remaining two configuration 
types SH and SR reflect different qualitative-quantitative 
philosophies, which we are going to investigate now. 
3 RANKING MEASURES 
The principle SR, which is equivalent to idempotence for 
#,characterizes what might be called pure semi-quantita­
tive quasi-probabilistic accounts. Adopting this condition 
considerably simplifies our valuation structure. First, it 
allows us to identify# with max«, because for n .S! x .S! y, 
we have y � x # y � y # y = y = max«{x, y}. Together 
with 2.1.5 and the absorptive character of n, this guaran­
tees that [n, e]« is closed for# and c. Furthermore, 2.1.6 
gives us R."B '= [n, e ]«. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we may 
concentrate on SR-type valuation algebras of the form 
([n, e]«, m�<, •, n, e, «). From 2.3 we know that this 
structure can be completely described by the positive half 
of an ordered commutative group which has been topped 
by an absorptive n. The converse of the resulting ex­
tended order is just our valuation ordering<<. Another in­
teresting consequence is that we can now drop the dis­
jointness condition in 1.1. Because we want to ensure that 
R(A) = n encodes real impossibility, unions of impos­
sible events should not be allowed to embrace a possible 
one. All this suggests the following definition extending 
previous proposals in [Weyden 91, 92]. 
Definition 3.1 C8, R., V) is called a ranking-measure 
space iff 
1. � = (B, u, n, -, 0, 1) is a boolean algebra 
2. V = (V, a,«) (ranking algebra) is s.t. 
• (V\{ n}, •, ») is the positive half of an ordered 
commutative group with identity e, 
• n is «-minimal and absorptive for c. 
3. R: B -> V (ranking measure) is a function satisfying 
R(O) = n, R.(1) = e and 
R(A u B)= max«{'R(A), 'R(B) }. 
4. If A= U\Pi I i E I} and for all i E I, R.(Pi) = n, then 
R(A) = n (coherence). 
Observe that coherence is automatically satisfied for com­
pact boolean algebras (i.e. where every covering of an 
event has a finite subcovering). What we still have to 
prove is that ranking measures really fit into our general 
quasi-measure framework. 
Theorem 3.1 Ranking-measure spaces are quasi-measure 
spaces and ranking algebras are hierarchical valuation 
algebras. 
Proof: 1.0, 1.1 : obvious, 1.2, 1.3 : properties of max«, o 
and o, 1.4: absorptiveness of n together with the group 
ordering condition, 1.5, 1.6 : immediate, I. 7 : by the 
group ordering condition, 1.8 : take w = v', 1.9 : let's 
assume n � v � v' � e. If v:::: n, we choose w == n. If v o�= n, 
we consider the corresponding full group (cf. 2.3). Here, 
we can fmd a w with v' o w == v. If e « w, then v':::: v' o e « 
v' • w == v, which contradicts our assumption. Hence w � 
e. Ranking algebras are hierarchical because they verify � 
= <«<. 
Ranking measures are the simplest instances of quasi­
measures. For every ordered commutative group Iii, we 
can defme a corresponding ranking algebra V(fi). Notice 
that we can embed V(Z) in each nontrivial V(Cii) (V o�= {n, 
e} ), Z = (Int, +, <) being the ordered additive group of 
integers. Other natural structures are V(Q) and V(R), for 
Q = (Rat,+,<), R = (IR, +,<).Ranking measures do not 
necessarily satisfy :R.(u( Ai I i E I})= sup«{:R.(Aj) I i E I} 
for mutually disjoint Aj. In the classical probabilistic 
framework, this relation can only be violated for un­
countable I. Here, it may fail for countable I. The boolean 
algebras are most of the time set algebras. In fact, we can 
often lift ranking measures to power set structures. 
Theorem 3.2 Let ClS, :R., V) be a ranking measure space 
where lS is a set algebra on S, the valuation ordering « is 
complete (i.e. «-infima exist) and n « inf« 1 :R.(P) J P E B, 
n « :R.(P) }. Then there is a canonical extension :R. * of :R. 
to the powerset structure lS* = (2S, u, n, -, 0. S) on S 
s.t. < :8 *, :R. *, V) is a ranking measure space and :R. * is 
the maximal extension w.r.t. the «-induced pointwise or­
dering on ranking-measures from lS * to v. 
Proof sketch : :R. * defined by :R *(A) = in�< { :R.(P) I A � 
P, P E B} for A� S is as desired. 
In the literature, ranking-measure-like notions have been 
considered for different purposes. In [Weydert 91], we 
have provided a simple ranking measure semantics for 
default conditionals and comparative modalities (formali­
zing negligibility) together with a corresponding axioma­
tic characterization. In [Weydert 93], this approach has 
been extended to default quantifiers, i.e. genuine first­
order contexts. A semantics for belief based on sets of 
ranking measures, different from what we discuss in this 
paper, can be found in [Weydert 94]. 
A very influential and sophisticated framework has 
been proposed by Spohn [88, 90]. His ordinal conditional 
functions (OCF) are intended to measure relative dis­
belief and model iterated belief changes. Their domains 
have the form 2S \{ 0} and the valuation structure is 
(Ord, +', <), with Ord being the class of ordinal numbers 
{0, 1, 2, ... w, w +' 1, ... , w +' 0>, w +' ro +' 1, ... }, +'the 
ordinal number addition and<' the converse of the ordi­
nal number ordering ( ... <' ro <' ... <' 1 <' 0). Because 
there is no absorptive value for 0 and, in particular, 
because+' is not commutative (w +' 1 o�- w == 1 +' w), his 
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approach is not directly subsumed by ours. We could use 
another connective +0 based on polynomial representa-
tions (a:= anro�n +' ... +' a1 ro�1 +' ao). which is commu­
tative. But we still wouldn't get accessibility because 
there is no x with 1 +0 x = w. Of course, for Spohn's 
natural conditional functions (NCF), which take their 
values from Nat, this problem doesn't arise. Here, the 
valuation structure basically becomes V(Z). For many 
practical purposes, this might be enough. In [Goldszmidt, 
Pearl 92], for instance, this formalism has been used for 
modeling nonmonotonic inference with variable-strength 
defaults. 
Possibility measures [Dubois, Prade 91] are another 
related and quite popular quasi-probabilistic tool for 
reasoning about uncertainty. Here, the domains are power 
sets and the valuation structure is of the form ([0, 1], <). 
Because conditional possibility measures are defined 
through min, stronger c-like connectives are not con­
sidered. Spohn's account and possibility theory both 
assume that their measures are fully additive, i.e. R(A) = 
sup«{:R.({a}) I a E A). However, this shouldn't be a 
general postulate. If we want to avoid an infinitary form 
of the lottery paradox, we will need semi-quantitative 
measures :R. compatible with homogeneously small sin­
gletons, i.e. with v E V s.t . R( {a})= v « e for all a E S.  
4 CUMULATIVE MEASURES 
Probabilistic and ranking measures are situated at the 
extremes of the quasi-measure range. Both fairly popular, 
they are characterized by different strengths and weak­
nesses. Probabilities are well suited for a fine-grained, 
e.g. decision-theoretic analysis in finite or continuous 
contexts where precise numbers are available. For their 
semi-qualitative counterparts, quite the opposite is true. 
They are most appropriate when we are interested in a 
simple, cheap, rough, mainly number-free evaluation of 
plausibility, e.g. in default reasoning or (full) belief revi­
sian. When modeling plain belief, for instance, we want 
to avoid any confidence loss when conjoining two beliefs. 
Within the classical probabilistic framework, this can 
only be achieved by attributing measure zero to -, <p if <p 
is believed. However. when we have to revise our beliefs 
based on new evidence supporting -,<p we get into trouble 
bec��s� subsets of a null set cannot be differentiated pro­
babilJstJcally. For ranking measures, this problem doesn't 
arise. Here, believing <p means associating a non-ma­
ximal, but not necessarily minimal ranking measure value 
to --, <p. This guarantees that beliefs are closed under 
co�junction. At the same time, Spohn-type conditionali­
zatiOn allows us to formulate reasonable revision pro­
cedures. Furthermore, we do no longer have to care about 
measurability constraints, the prohibition of uniform 
countable sample spaces and the representation of im­
possibility. On �he other hand, everybody will agree that 
the repres
_
entatwnal a�d inferential power of ranking 
measures ts rather restricted. In fact, it seems as if both 
formalisms were largely complementary. Consequently, 
580 Weydert 
we should try to combine them in a powerful framework 
sharing the basic advantages of both. 
The major issue is to extend the usual probabilistic 
framework far enou gh to allow differentiation among and 
especially con dit ioning on sets of vanishing probability. 
The idea is to introduce a hierarchy of mainly classical 
valu ation contexts such that from the perspective of any 
gi ven level, lower ranks are con sider ed negligible or ir­
relevant, i.e. would get probability zero within a standard 
interpretation . Our strategy i s to use a ranking algebra V 
= (V. c. «) for describing the rough, global hierarchical 
structure and the real probabilistic valuation algebra :R+ 
= (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <),i.e. the standard positive real n um­
ber algebra, for the more conventional, fine-grained local 
structure. The main task is now to merge these structures 
in a suitable way. This is done by the fo llo wing defini­
tion . 
Definition 4.1 LetV" = (V0, max«, c0, no. e0, «0) be a 
ranking and '.R.+ = (IR+, +, x, 0, 1, <)be the real valuation 
algebra. Then we call H(V0, R+) = ( H(V0, '.R.+), #, c, n, 
e, «) a cumulative algebra with global structure V0 and 
local structure R.+ iff 
• H(V0, R+) := { (n, 0)} u V'\{n}xlR+ \{0}, and 
for all (a, r), (a', r') E H(V0, R+), 
• (a, r) #(a', r') =(a, r + r') if a= a', 
=(a', r') if a «0a', 
::; (a, r) if a' «0a, 
• (a, r) c (a', r') = (a c 0a ', r x r'), 
• n = (n°,0)ande = (e0,1), 
• (a, r) «(a', r') iff a «0a' or (a= a' and a< a'). 
The definition of H(V0, :.R+) as a proper subset of V0xlR+ 
excluding (n°, r) for r t:. 0 and (a, 0) for a 1= n° ensure s that 
there are no zero-divisors (x, y t:. n w it h x c y = n, e.g. for 
x = (a, 0) and y = (n°, r)) or trivial violations of 
multiplicative monotony by (a, 0) * n, (e, r) « (e, 1) and 
(a, 0) c (e, r) =(a, 0) c (e, 1). For the multiplicative con­
nective, the componentwise strategy is the obvious one to 
guarantee those properties which are required for enco­
ding independency (cf part 2). The lexicographic order­
ing reflects our basic stratification philosophy. Finding an 
appropriate additive connective, however, is less straight­
forward. Within single ranks (a = a'), we must adopt the 
pointwise approach (a, r) #(a', r') =(max« {a, a'}, r + r'), 
because distributivity and the intended isomorphism bet­
ween { e} xR+ \{ 0} and R+ \ { 0 I (i.e. real valuation algebra 
at the top) allow the derivation of (a, r) # (a, r') = ((a, 1) c 
(e, r)) #((a, 1) c (e, r')) =(a, 1) c ((e, r) # (e, r')) =(a, 1) c 
(e, r + r') = (a, r + r'). But additions in vo lvin g different 
ranks cannot be handled that way. To satisfy additive ac­
cessibility, e.g. to pass from (a, 1) with a «0e to the bigger 
value (e, r) for r < 1, we would have to introduce negative 
num be rs on the right-hand-side, which simply doesn't 
make sense. In fact, it would again bring in oddities like 
(a, 0) for at:. n°. Notice that multiplicative acces sibili ty 
already has brought us to consider (a, r) with 1 < r to get 
from (e, 1/r) to (a, 1). Taking all these precautions, our 
structures are well-behaved. 
Theorem 4.1 Cumulative algebras are hierarchical valua­
tion algebras. They verify S H if the ranking algebra is 
no n-trivial (V0# {D0, e0}). 
Proof: Let H(V0 , :.R+) = (H(V0, R+), #, c, n, e, «) be a 
cumulative algebra. 
1. Jl.(V0, R+) is a valuation algebra. 
1.2 Additive structure. Commutat ivity and the neutrality 
of n::: (n°, 0) are obvious. To see that associativity holds, 
consider any ((a, r) #(a', r')) #(a", r") and (a, r) #((a', r') # 
(a", r")). If one left component is bigger than the other 
two, the sums are just identical to the corresponding pair. 
If the left components are equal, we can use the associa­
tivity of +. If only two of them are iden tical and the 
remaining one is smaller, we can drop the associated pair 
and the above expressions become equal to the sum of the 
former . 
1.3 Multiplicative structure. Obvious because of the co r­
responding properties for (V0, c0) and (IR+, x). 
1.4Distributivity. If a' =a", then (a,r) c ((a', r')#(a",r"))= 
(a o0a', r X (r' + r")) := (ac0a',r X r' + r x r") = (ac0a', r X r') 
# (a c 0a", r x r") = ((a, r) c (a', r')) # ((a, r) c (a", r")). 
If a' «0a", then (a, r) c ((a', r') #(a", r")) =(a, r) c (a", r") = 
((a, r) c (a', r')) # ((a, r) " (a", r")) by the multiplicative 
monotony of o0 or, if a= no and r = 0, by absorption. 
1.5 Linearity. Follows directly from that of «0 and <. 
1.6 Additive monotony. If a «0 b «0 a', then (a, r) « (a', r') 
implies (a, r) c (b, s) = (b, s) «(a ', r') =(a', r') c (b, s). The 
rem aining possibilities are immediate. 
1.7 Multiplicative monotony. Immediate from the multi­
plicative monotony ofV0 and R+ and n = (n°, 0). 
1.8 Additive accessibility. If (a, r) « (a', r'), then we have 
either a��o a' and (a, r) #(a', r') =(a', r'), or a= a' and r < r' 
and the additive accessibility of 1t+ gives us r" with (a, r) 
#(a, r") = (a', r'). 
1.9 Multiplicative accessibility. By the corresponding fea­
ture ofV0 and :.R+ and the definition of H(V0, R.+)· 
2. Jl.(V0, :.R+) is hierarchical. (a, r) «« (a', r') iff (a', r') # 
(a, r) = (a', r') iff a «0a' or (a, r) = (n°, 0), which describes 
a modular relation. 
3. SH holds. (e0, 1) #(a, r) = (e0, 1) for some (a, r) with 
(n°, 0) « (a, r) « (e0, 1), which exists by V0's nontriviality. 
The next defmition now introduces our main concept. 
Definition 4.2 A quasi-m easure whose valuation algebra 
is a cumulative algebra is called a cumulative measure. 
Notice that real measures can be seen as special cumula­
tive measures using the trivial ranking algebra, i.e. where 
V 0 = ( { o0, e0} ,  � 0, «0). The main purpose of our cumula­
tive constructions is to provide a general, quasi-proba­
bilistic framework supporting something like shifting gra­
nularity. Locally, we are dealing with a classical nume­
rical context, but globally, we adopt the ranking perspec­
tive. Conditioning allows us to pass between levels and, 
as we shall see, to model plain belief revision without 
being forced to give up all the useful classical proba­
bilistic or measure-theoretic tools. The idea is to use the 
(top-ranked) local probabilities for decision-theoretic 
purposes and the global ranking structure for revision 
tasks. Of course, we have to expect that some features get 
lost. Completeness, for instance, can at best be guaran­
teed within bounded segments of ranks. That is, there 
might well be disjoint Ai, e.g. with R(AD = (a, i) for i E 
Nat, where sup« { R(Ai)l i E Nat } doesn't exist. On the 
other hand, we are no longer troubled by measurability 
constraints. Every cumulative (and therefore every proba­
bilistic) measure on a set-algebra can be extended to a 
cumulative measure on the whole powerset 
Theorem 4.2 Let C B ,  R, H(V, :R+) ) be a cumulative 
measure space where :B is a set algebra on S and R +  = 
(lR+, +, x, 0, 1, <). Then there is an extension R * of R to 
the powerset structure :B* = (2s,  u, n. -, 0. S) on S and 
a ranking algebra V* s.t. R * is a cumulative measure and 
V a substructure of V*. 
This result is different from our corresponding theorem 
3.2 for ranking measures insofar as here, in general, we 
don't have neither a canonical extension nor constant 
valuation algebras (i.e. V = V '). 
Another proposal to reconcile the advantages of 
probabilistic and ranking measures has been made by 
Boutilier [Boutilier 93). Roughly speaking, the structures 
he considers could be interpreted as special, restricted 
instances of cumulative measure spaces. Basically, his 
approach has been designed for finite boolean algebras, 
but - to a certain extent - it can be generalized to infinite 
ones. The idea is to have a possibility ranking on atoms 
and a probability measure 1lr attached to each level r 
which vanishes for measurable propositions built up from 
atoms of other ranks. Given an event A, we look for the 
highest rank r where its probability 1lr(A) becomes stric­
tly positive. Boutilier doesn't present a fully integrated 
account with combined valuation scales, but in our termi­
nology, A would get the value (r, 1lr(A)). 
The approach, as it stands, has several shortcomings. 
First of all, it relies on possibility measures, which are not 
general enough for some purposes (e.g. for modeling 
infmite boolean algebras based on countably many small 
atoms). Secondly, his definition forces us to use well­
founded rankings, which seems to be a quite artificial res­
triction. In fact, the only well-founded ranking algebras 
are V(Z) and the trivial one. But the main problem with 
Boutilier's theory is that it doesn't really fit into the quasi­
measure framework. Because the local values are sup-
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plied by probabilistic valuations, they cannot exceed 1 .  
Consequently, multiplicative accessibility will fail, i.e. 
there will be no smooth account of conditional measures 
and our valuation freedom will be severely restricted. For 
instance, we may encounter valuated events, less "pro­
bable" than their complements, for which there can't be 
another event which is exactly two times as "probable". 
So, it seems justified to say that Boutilier's formalism 
achieves only a partial integration of the quantitative and 
the qualitative viewpoint. 
5 BELIEF STRUCTURES 
Traditionally, epistemic states of ideal agents have often 
been represented or approximated by probabilistic or dis­
crete ranking measures on world sets. Unfortunately, as 
mentioned before, these pure approaches exhibit serious 
weaknesses. The first one, for instance, fails either to 
represent (by admitting full beliefs with probabilities 
below 1) or to revise plain belief (trivialization by condi­
tioning on null sets). It also runs into problems because of 
measurability constraints affecting the realization of 
countably infmite uniform belief spaces. The second one, 
on the other hand, is unsuitable for fine-grained represen­
tation and decision-taking tasks where it makes a dif­
ference whether one option is as or twice as plausible as 
another one (which cannot be expressed by ranking 
measures). In particular, there is no possibility to model 
statistical knowledge directly by Spohn-type degrees of 
belief. Basically, these problems call for refined valuation 
structures backing the necessary differentiations. Of 
course, this can be done in many different ways. Either 
indirectly and hidden by a sophisticated machinery [Bac­
chus et al. 92] , or directly, by combining complementary 
uncertainty formalisms, as we do. In the following, we 
are going to sketch some ingredients of an epistemic 
framework based on cumulative measures, which allows 
a correct handling of our benchmarks. 
First of all, we have to address the question about the 
nature of epistemic states. Here, we want to adopt a libe­
ral attitude. Epistemic states should not be identified with 
any kind of measures. This would be an oversimplifica­
tion contradicting our subjective experience of what cons­
titutes real-world belief (inconsistency, partiality, vague­
ness, mixture of qualitative and quantitative contents, 
deductive incompleteness, . . .  ). What we will assume, 
however, is that any given epistemic state s can be inter­
preted or evaluated so as to provide a cumulative measure 
'Rs describing the corresponding official, surface belief 
structure, to be exploited for practical purposes like 
decision-tasks. This approach might be called the projec­
tion model of belief. The domain of Rs is formed by the 
propositions of our actual language (state) u, which we 
assume to be boolean. The valuation algebm is assumed 
to be non-trivial . Backed by the pleasant properties of 
cumulative measures, we can now represent plain belief 
in the traditional way without having to care about the 
shortcomings of the probabilistic account. Let's express 
"within the epistemic state s ,  A is plainly believed" by 
s I= B(A). 
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Plain belief : 
s I= B(A) iff Rs(A) = (e0, 1) 
What's important is that this doesn't force us to stipulate 
Rs(-,A) = (D0, 0), i.e. the impossibility of -,A, because 
(e0, 1) = :Rs(T) = Rs(A v -,A) = :Rs(A) # :Rs(-,A) = 
(e0, 1) # (a, r) is possible and true for (n°, 0) « (a, r) « 
(e0, 1). Plainly believing A is not the same as rejecting 
the possibility of -,A. Also, we can differentiate between 
beliefs with regard to their revisability or epistemic en­
trenchment by attributing either bigger or smaller mea­
sure values to their complements (cf. below). A basic 
characteristic of plain beliefs is their closure under 
conjunctions. 
Conjunctive closure : 
If Rs(A), :Rs(A') = (e0, 1), then Rs(A & A') = (e0, 1) 
This holds because :Rs(-,A v -,A') = max« {R.s(--,A), 
Rs(--,A')) «« (e0, 1). Of course, we may also adopt less 
certain attitudes and assign intermediate values. Indif­
ference w.r.t. A, for instance, mnounts to state 'R.s(--,A) = 
Rs(A) = (e0, 0.5). In first-order contexts, it is easy to 
imagine situations where the additive structure of clas­
sical valuation algebras becomes inappropriate. For ins­
tance, let 'l'(x) be an opaque number-theoretic property 
for which we know that there is exactly one solution, but 
where we cannot give any bounds. Then, it seems reason­
able to adopt a symmetric attitude, which can easily be 
realized within our cumulative framework. Let's assume 
that .Ls is powerful enough to express 'P(.n.), the .n. being 
natural number constants. 
Infinitary uniformity � 
:Rs('l'(Q)) = :Rs('l'(l)) = . . .  = {a, 1) «« {e0, 1), e.g. 
In addition, we need of course a possibly nondeterministic 
revision mechanism N which, given an epistemic state s 
and a new item of information i, defines a set of possible 
updates N[i ](s). In general, i will be a constraint for the 
cumulative measures :Rs' of admissible revision states s' , 
e.g. i = [:R (A) = (e0, 1)] . A minimal condition for this 
'N[i] can be borrowed from the classical paradigm. 
Top-conditionalization : 
Rs'(B) = Rs(B I A) if :Rs(B I A) has the form (e0, r) 
We cannot require full conditionalization because this 
would force us to accept :Rs'(--,A) = :RS:--,A I A) = (0°, 0), 
precluding nontrivial updating with -,A.  That is, we 
would be confronted again to the problems of the tradi­
tional framework, we want to escape. 
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